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THE CONSCIOUS SEMIOTIC MIND
SU M M A RY: The paper discusses possible roles of consciousness in a semiotic 
(meaning-making) activity of a cognitive agent. The discussion, we claim, is 
based on two related approaches to consciousness: on Chalmers’ theory of 
phenomenal and psychological consciousness and on Damasio’s neural theo-
ry, which draws a distinction between core and extended consciousness.
Two stages of cognitive-semiotic processing are discussed: the moment of 
perception of a sign as a meaningful entity and the metasemiotic processes 
understood as the human capacity to reflect on signs and their usage, analyse 
and control processes of recognition, interpretation of signs and to detect and 
correct errors in semiotic activity.
In the case of the first stage, it is argued that signs as meaningful entities 
have a distincly experiential character. The feeling of meaningfulness is a re-
sult of phenomenal consciousness, in particular a result of the so-called valu-
ation features of phenomenal experience. I claim that this aspect of cogni-
tive-semiotic activity is possible owing to a special neural mechanism called 
a semiotic marker.
It is argued that semiotic systems have to be able to use signs as signs, i.e. 
they should display some metacognitive capacities, in particular an ability to 
analyse semiosis at a metalevel. It is argued that such metasemiosis is depen-
dent on psychological consciousness (in Chalmers’ terms: awareness) and is 
realized at the neural level in the form of extended consciousness. 
The paper is based on a particular understanding of cognitive semiotics as 
a discipline involving analyses of cognitive processes as semiotic processes, i.e. 
processes requiring usage of signs.
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1. A VIEW ON COGNITIVE SEMIOTICS
As Sonesson (2012, p. 208) notes, “cognitive semiotics has been 
invented many times over during the past few decades”. In the context 
of the statement it is not surprising that different researchers take 
different perspectives towards such a marriage of cognitive, linguistic 
and semiotic studies. Sonesson himself characterizes cognitive semiotics 
as an approach which a i m s  t o  w e d  c o g n i t i v e  s c i e n c e  a n d 
s e m i o t i c s . In a similar vein, Zlatev (2012, p. 2) defines cognitive 
semiotics as a discipline whose “ultimate goal is to provide new 
insights into the nature and culture of human beings, as well as other 
meaning-making creatures […]”. Cognitive Semiotics (henceforth 
CS) can be defined as an interdisciplinary matrix of (subparts of) 
disciplines and methods, focused on the multifaceted phenomenon 
of meaning. This article presents some aspects of cognitive semiotics 
as seen from the perspective of standard cognitive science1 – from the 
Chalmersian (1996) conception of mind. The approach presented in 
this paper highlights the role of signs, in particular linguistic signs, 
in the explanations of cognitive functioning of a cognitive agent. 
Consequently, my understanding of cognitive semiotics is that it 
encourages us to study cognitive systems, either natural ones like 
animals or human beings, or, possibly, artificial ones such as sign-using 
and meaning-making systems. In other words, I assume that at least 
some cognitive processes involve, in a nontrivial way2, the use of signs. 
This means that there are sign-using (semiotic) processes which are 
1 The qualification “standard” or “cognitivist” seems to be necessary here, as 
cognitive semiotics highlights the role of non-standard: enactive and embodied 
cognitive science. My approach is grounded in the “old-fashioned” or Cartesian 
cognitive science based on the notion of representation and cognitive modeling 
(either symbolic or connectionist) as a primary method. See e.g. Harnish (2002) 
for a systematic presentation of standard cognitive science and Rowlands (2010) 
for discussion on the relationship between standard cognitive science and “4e” 
approaches (enacted, embodied, embedded, extended). 
2 “Nontrivial” here means that neither one can describe, nor explain, such 
cognitive systems without mentioning the notions of ‘sign’ and ‘meaning’.
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in fact cognitive processes. For now I leave open the question as to 
whether all semiotic processes or only some of them are cognitive. 
Even if just some of them happen to be cognitive, we can still gain 
some knowledge about the nature of semiosis by studying selected 
cognitive activities. 
My cognitive reading of semiosis (and semiotic reading of cognition) 
is motivated by the Peircean theory of signs, semiosis as well as his 
epistemology. The Peircean notion of a sign states that, “a sign, or 
representamen is something that stands to somebody for something 
in some respect or capacity. […] The sign stands for something, its 
object. It stands not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea 
which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen” 
(CP 2.228). In consequence, the notions of a representamen, its 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and a r e s p e c t  are of special importance. 
The meaning of a sign, in turn, arises in the (dynamic) process of 
interpretation of the sign. Instead of a dyadic relationship between 
a sign and its object, we have here a triadic relationship involving 
interpretation as the third element. I interpret the notion of a sign in 
terms of the Peircean definition. In addition, the Peircean theory of 
signs is understood here not in a narrow sense, as a description of actual 
and possible signs and sign systems, but is interpreted in a broader 
sense, as a theory addressing fundamental questions of cognition, its 
relation to reality as well as a logical analysis of knowledge3. 
Any human being, or – more generally – any meaning-making 
creature (to use Zlatev’s formulation4) uses signs in his or her 
everyday cognitive activity. Sign-using agents recognize smoke as 
3 It is worth mentioning that Peirce also proposed a classification of conscio-
usness in connection with his triadic definition of a sign. According to Peircean 
classification, (pure) feeling is consciousness of the Firstness (CP 7.551); e x p e -
r i e n c e  (CP 8.266) or A l t e r s e n s e  (CP 7.551) is consciousness of “otherness or 
secondness”, and – finally – M e d i s e n s e  (CP 7.544) is awareness of the Third-
ness. The latter may be divided further into a b s t r a c t i o n , s u g g e s t i o n  and 
a s s o c i a t i o n  (CP 7.544–548). In addition, consciousness has a bodily (neural) 
and social dimension (CP 575). See also (Houser 1983).
4 It is necessary to notice that Zlatev uses the formulation – in line with Thomp-
son’s (2007) approach – only in reference to natural, a u t o n o m o u s  systems (see 
also: Zlatev 2009, Thompson, Stapleton 2009). In other words, Zlatev excludes 
possible artificial systems from the scope of meaning-making creatures; in his view 
artificial systems cannot be truly “cognitive”.
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a sign of fire, photos as signs of real people and a red traffic light as 
a sign of an obligation to stop. In addition, natural-language using 
creatures recognize certain sounds as sounds of language and (at least 
sometimes) they are able to understand and interpret these sounds 
as signs, i.e sounds standing for something else in some respect. One 
can interpret in a similar way more complex (or: high-level) cognitive 
abilities. One of the basic cognitive activities discussed within cognitive 
science, namely the problem-solving activity, calls for the use of signs 
(in the broad sense: indexes, icons or symbols) as clues or premises 
and usually requires an interpretation of such signs’ indications5. (The 
reader can imagine here Sherlock Holmes solving one of his cases.) 
In a similar vein, one can emphasize the role of signs (and semiosis) 
in other activities like decision making, planning, etc. I would like to 
stress that analyses in terms of signs and meanings are not only a fancy 
way of describing these activities, but I am convinced that sign using 
and meaning making are unavoidable elements of these activities6. 
The main point of the paper is that all these (and similar) 
cognitive-semiotic activities require some form of consciousness. This 
is in line with the general phenomenological orientation of cognitive 
semiotics. Cognitive semiotics highlights the importance of the first-
person perspective by stressing the role of consciousness understood 
as a subjective, qualitative experience. Phenomenology, in turn, is 
considered to be an approach which provides the right kind of method 
for studying the structure and content of consciousness (Zlatev 2012, 
p. 2).
In contradistinction to the above assumption, however, I am 
convinced that phenomenological experience goes well beyond 
phenomena involved in semiotic activity which are merely labelled as 
5 As one of the reviewers of the paper noted, this statement concerning 
a problem-solving activity may be interpreted as a statement about the dependence 
of problem-solving on its capacity to use symbols. The remark is justified in 
light of enactive approaches to cognition (e.g. Noë 2004), supported by some 
robotic experiments (Brooks 1991, Beer 1995), where not only symbols, but 
representations in general are rejected. To clarify my viewpoint, I take problem-
solving to be one of the higher-level, “representation-hungry” activities (cf. Clark, 
Toribio 1994) and – as such – involving (at least partially) usage of signs. It does 
not imply the necessity to use symbols.
6 In other words, I am taking here a realist stance towards semiotic phenome-
na rather than an instrumentalist one. 
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“conscious”; indeed, I suggest that we should broaden our perspective 
by including analyses of instances of so-called psychological 
consciousness (or awareness, cf. Chalmers 2004, pp. 618–619).
In what follows I present the conceptual background of the paper – 
the notion of a cognitive-semiotic system and a notion of consciousness 
(section 2). Section 3 presents two distinctions concerning the notion of 
consciousness: a philosophical one, based on the Chalmersian approach, 
and a neuroscientific stance based on Damasio’s theory. Sections 4 and 
5 are devoted to the two stages in the cognitive processing of signs. 
Section 4 presents the initial stage, that of sign perception. I highlight 
here the role of phenomenal experience of meaningfulness and its role 
in the cognitive activity of a sign-using agent. In section 5 I propose 
a metasemiotic level of analysis of semiosis.
2. TWO BASIC NOTIONS
Before taking a look at the role of consciousness in a semiotic and 
cognitive activity, let me elaborate the two key notions of the paper, 
namely the notion of a cognitive-semiotic system and the notion of 
consciousness. 
2.1 A COGNITIVE-SEMIOTIC SYSTEM
The notion of a mind as a cognitive system is one of the basic 
notions used within standard, cognitivist (Thompson 2007) cognitive 
science. Keeping in mind the multidimensional character of a mind 
(phenomenal, emotional, subjective, cognitive, even computational), 
I will discuss – in line with the cognitivist approach – only cognitive 
aspects of mind. The focus on cognitive aspects is motivated by the 
initial assumption of the paper, i.e. the claim about a relationship that 
holds between cognition and semiosis. 
The term „cognitive system”, as I understand and use it, describes 
a complex, structured entity which is a subject of processes such as 
perception, action, reasoning, planning, problem soving, and natural 
language understanding. It is understood as a dynamic structure 
which receives environmental and bodily information, processes 
it according to its internal organization, stores the information and 
finally acts on the basis of this information (cf. Nęcka et al. 2006).
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As mentioned above, I am interested in a subclass of cognitive 
systems, namely cognitive-semiotic systems. Such systems are 
understood here as systems which use signs in their cognitive activity, 
i.e. they are able to create, distinguish, interpret signs as well as use 
them in directing their behavior. However, to avoid the temptation 
of behavioristic (cf. Fetzer 1997) interpretations of the statement7, 
one must take into account one more condition: any cognitive system 
should use signs a s  s i g n s, i.e. the system should treat signs as 
something that stands for something else in some respect or other. 
In other words, “the behavior of the system is causally affected by 
the presence of a sign because that sign stands for something else 
iconically, indexically, or symbolically, for that system” (Fetzer 1997, 
p. 358). As a consequence, the system is, or at least should be, aware 
that its mental activity and physical behavior is influenced by semiotic 
processes. 
2.2 CONSCIOUSNESS (AND AWARENESS)
As David Chalmers notes, “consciousness is an ambiguous term, 
referring to many different phenomena” (Chalmers 2004, p. 617). 
Contemporary literature on consciousness abounds with differing 
approaches to the phenomenon and various attempts to define it (cf. 
Jackendoff 2007, pp. 77–80 for an overview). The spectrum embraces, 
among others, eliminativist approaches, which treat consciousness 
as a useful fiction at best (Churchland 1981), reductionist theories 
(Place 1956, Smart 1959), functionalist approaches (Armstrong 1980, 
Putnam 1975) as well as theories highlighting the subjective character 
of conscious experience (Nagel 1974, Searle 1992). One can hardly 
disagree with Damasio, who claims that “the conflation of so many 
meanings around the word consciousness renders it almost unusable 
without qualification, and this conflation is probably responsible 
for the supreme status to which consciousness has been elevated” 
(Damasio 1999, p. 309). To avoid the danger of conflation of this kind, 
I would like to put my philosophical cards on the table: I understand 
7 I am not going to justify such avoidance – behaviorist approaches to mind 
have been severly criticized by philosophers representing different stances and 
repetition of all the arguments seems to be pointless. Consult e.g. (Kim 2011) for 
an overview. 
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the phenomenon of consciousness in the sense of Chalmers’ (1996) 
naturalistic and nonreductive theory of consciousness. Chalmers 
distinguishes between phenomenal and psychological consciousness, 
stressing both an experiential character of consciousness and a role 
of consciousness in a mental activity (functional aspect). Phenomenal 
consciousness is – in the context of this paper – an answer to the 
question: H o w  i s  i t  l i k e  t o  experience signs or meaningful 
entities? Awareness (or psychological consciousness), in turn, answers 
the question of what the role of conscious states (processes) in 
recognition, comprehension and usage of signs is? 
Even if one rejects materialistic approaches, which reduce 
consciousness to a brain activity (pace Place), one nowadays can hardly 
deny that it is impossible to discuss consciousness independently from 
the achievements of neuroscience8. This is the reason why I wish to 
suggest a kind of interpretation of Chalmers’ distinction in terms of 
a neuroscientific approach to consciousness – from the point of view 
of Damasio’s distinction between core and extended consciousness 
(Damasio 1999).
3. WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS?
To sum up the above terminological considerations, I treat 
consciousness as a heterogenous phenomenon, which involve two 
distinctions: a philosophical distinction between phenomenal and 
psychological notions of consciousness and a neuroscientific distinction 
between core and extended consciousness. The two approaches are 
presented below.
3.1 CHALMERS’ APPROACH TO CONSCIOUSNESS
In his nonreductive theory of consciousness, Chalmers attempts 
to explain a wide spectrum of phenomena called in commonsense 
language “conscious phenomena”. The phenomena include, inter 
8 The need of neuroscientific grounding is appreciated also within phenom-
enological tradition. Neurophenomenology (Varela 1996) is seen as an important 
project integrating phenomenological research on consciousness and results of 
neurosciences. In the case of standard, functionalist cognitive science the connec-
tion between consciousness studies and neuroscience is evident.
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alia, perceptual experiences (experience of redness, auditory 
experience of loud sound or tactile experience of a sheer surface), 
experience of pain, reportability of mental states (“I see red”), belief 
formation and revision (“I believe I should stop”), decision making 
(“I deliberately choose not to obey the rules and proceed despite the 
red light”), problem solving (“How to explain it to the policeman?”), 
planning, etc. All these phenomena may be treated as conscious ones. 
Analysing such and similar examples of mental activities, commonly 
acknowledged as “conscious”, Chalmers claims that these phenomena 
should be grouped into two classes: phenomenal and psychological, 
reflecting in this way the two ways of thinking or talking about 
consciousness9.
Certain cognitive subjects, particularly human beings10, sense 
the world and have feelings or experiences connected with sensory 
data. They experience – subjectively and privately – their world and 
their bodies. In that sense, cognitive agents are s e n t i e n t. On the 
other hand, in the context of standard cognitive science and studies 
on cognitive systems, cognitivists highlight the sensitivity of an agent 
to information and they stress the role of information in controling 
agents’ actions. In this sense cognitive agents are conscious as to 
whether they are able to adjust their mental or physical activity to 
incoming stimuli, state of knowledge, data in memory, etc. In other 
words, cognitive agents are s a p i e n t.
Both aspects of conscious phenomena: sentience and sapience 
have been stressed in the philosophy of mind: the first one has been 
elaborated and discussed in the phenomenological approaches as well 
as in the “subjectivist” theories (Nagel 1974, Searle 1992); the second 
one can be traced back to the behaviorist descriptions of cognitive 
systems11 and is present in contemporary materialist and functionalist 
theories (e.g. Kim 2000). Accordingly, one can associate, as Chalmers 
9 The distinction is somehow grounded in (and motivated by) Ned Block’s 
(1995) distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.
10 This formulation raises the question about a class of sentient creatures. Zla-
tev (2009, p. 1981) notes that a subject should be a “minimal self ” in the sense of 
Gallagher (2005) and enumerates – on the basis of first-, second- and third-person 
arguments – monkeys, dogs, cats, rats as possible sentient creatures. My argumen-
tation concerns primarily human beings.
11 I do not mean here eliminativist behaviorism.
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does, the above-mentioned two kinds of mental phenomena with the 
following types of consciousness.
Psychological consciousness (awareness) is a state in which 
a cognitive system has access to information which he or she uses 
in controling and directing their cognition. Most typical examples 
include reportability of mental states, belief formation and revision, 
discrimination and categorization as well as decision-making, problem 
solving, planning, etc. One is conscious psychologically when one 
is aware of the environment and its pariticular state (“There is red 
light”) as well as of his/her own bodily state (“I am cold”) or mental 
state (“I am too stressed”). In addition, the agent is able to report these 
states, draw conclusions and use the knowledge in directing his/her 
behavior. To apply the above characteristics to semiotic activity such 
as the detection or recognition of a red light (as distinguished from 
a green light) may result in awareness of an obligation to stop, to stop 
at an intersection (i.e. the sign here influences one’s behavior) or break 
the law (with an awareness of the consequences of such behavior). 
All these mental activities: distinguishing, reacting, reasoning about 
consequences are examples of awareness. As Chalmers notices (1996, 
p. 28), in everyday settings we use the word “consciousness” in 
reference to such a situation12. 
Phenomenal consciousness is, in turn, a state in which a cognitive 
agent experiences subjectively the perceptual stimuli. In other words, 
there i s  s o m e t h i n g  i t  i s  l i k e  t o  b e  a cognitive agent; in 
particular, there is something it is like to be a conscious creature. 
(Nagel 1974, Chalmers 2004, p. 619) When an agent is suffering pain, 
if he or she is enjoying experienced sounds of someone’s speech, if 
a cognitive system is experiencing redness (or roundness) of a signal 
on a traffic light or coldness of the day, all this is a manifestation of 
phenomenal consciousness13. The reader may have noticed some 
correlations between both psychological and phenomenal examples. 
On the one hand, I am aware of a red light: I can report it, I can react 
12 From the functional point of view, it is the only aspect of consciousness that 
is explainable. As Putnam notices (1981) even if there is something more, it cannot 
be explained in a functionalist framework.
13 The reference to Nagel is somehow misleading: subjectivity – according to 
his approach – consists of two aspects: phenomenal content and particular indivi-
dual point of view (perspective).
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in the presence of it; on the other hand, I experience subjectively 
redness. This is no coincidence: it may be the case that the two types 
of consciousness are closely related14.
I would like to stress that the difference between phenomenal and 
psychological consciousness presented above is not only terminologi-
cal (“two senses of the word”) or conceptual (“two concepts of con-
sciousness”. The distinction may reflect the ontology of the world 
containing cognitive agents. 
3.2 DAMASIO’S APPROACH
The second distinction has been suggested by Antonio Damasio, 
who has drawn a distinction between core and extended consciousness, 
based on the results reported in neuroscience. According to Damasio, 
core consciousness is a very basic process which enables a sense of 
self: a sense of the here and now. That is, an agent is aware of feelings 
occuring at the moment when his or her internal state changes. Core 
consciousness is a result of the interaction between a mind and an 
external entity (Damasio uses the term “object”). To quote Damasio: 
“the brain of the organism creates an image of its internal state, an 
image of the object, and an image of the internal state as it is modified 
by its interaction with the object. In addition, it creates a second-order 
image that includes all of these and m a y  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  f e e l i n g 
o f  t h e  c o r e  s e l f  e x p e r i e n c i n g  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  q u a l i a ” 
(Damasio 1999; my emphasis).
To highlight the basic features of core consciousness: it is a simple, 
biological phenomenon and it is stable across an agent’s lifetime. 
Damasio claims that we, human beings, share this type of consciousness 
with some other species. 
Such a characterization suggests that core consiousness may be 
closely correlated with phenomenal consciousness (in Chalmers’ sense). 
I would say that the philosophical notion of phenomenal consciousness 
is implemented at the neural level in the form of core consciousness15. 
14 Chalmers claims that i t  i s  a  f a c t  a b o u t  o u r  w o r l d  (Chalmers 1997, 
p. 18) that psychological processes of awareness are accompanied by experiences.
15 However, I do not suggest that core consciousness is limited to phenomenal 
consciousness; the experiential aspect of consicousnes goes beyond core conscio-
usness.
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I would like to stress that, according to Damasio, core consciousness 
does not depend on higher cognitive processes like planning, reasoning 
or language (Damasio 1999, p. 16). 
On the other hand, Damasio distinguishes extended consciousness, 
which goes beyond an agent’s “here and now” and beyond his or her 
basic feelings. It enables “an elaborate sense of self” (Damasio 1999, 
p. 16), i.e. an agent’s awarenes of location in space and time (including 
memories and predictions of the future), an explicit distintion 
between „me and other” and between a subject and his or her 
environment. It enables deliberations on possible causes and results 
of actions as well as on failures and successes. Finally, it provides 
explicit metaknowledge in that it allows one to access consciousness. 
According to Damasio (1999, p. 16), extended consciousness is 
a complex biological phenomenon; it requires both long-term 
memory and working memory and it evolves during the lifetime of an 
agent. Because extended consciousness in its highest form is partially 
a result of language, it is supposedly present only in human beings. 
Characterized in such a way, extended consciousness may be treated 
as a neural realization of psychological consciousness. As stated by 
Damasio (1999, p. 201), “Extended consciousness is a bigger subject 
than core consciousness, and yet it is easier to address scientifically. 
We understand fairly well what it consists of cognitively and we also 
understand the corresponding behavioral features”. The quotation 
matches Chalmers’ characteristics of awareness.
4. PERCEPTION OF A SIGN
With the above distinctions and clarifications made, I can now 
present putative roles of consciousness in the semiotic activity of 
a cognitive agent.
One of the basic methods used within cognitive science is cognitive 
modeling. This method focuses on computational – either symbolic, 
connectionist or hybrid – simulation of cognition. Cognitive models are 
based on the initial set of facts (initial knowledge) and certain control 
structures specifying how to cope with the data. Cognitive models 
are supposed not only to produce the same or similar behavior as 
human beings; they should also predict behavior as well as learn task-
specific knowledge (cf. Taatgen, Anderson 2008). As I have argued 
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elsewhere (Konderak 2015), it is possible and fruitful to model in this 
way a process of semiosis and, in particular, language comprehension, 
interpretation and production (cf. Konderak 2007). To create a model 
of cognitive ability one usually analyses the processes modeled into 
a number of stages or steps. In the present chapter I will follow the 
procedure, indicating steps in cognitive processing important from 
the point of view of semiosis. In my opinion, there are at least three 
areas of activity involving a semiotic (sign-using, meaning-making) 
mind in which the role of consciousness is indispensable, namely: 
– an initial step: perception (proprioception) of an object as possibly 
meaningful (e.g. I see someone waving her or his hands; it may be the 
case that I do not understand what that waving is supposed to mean; 
I may even wrongly treat it as meaningful); 
– establishment or recognition of the relationship between that 
perceived phenomenon (Representamen in Peircean terms) and its 
Object (once again, understood in the framework of Peircean theory 
of signs) (e.g. I interpret such waving as a sign of a windy area);
– metasemiotic processes (explicit analysis of a sign as a sign), including 
recognition of a ground of the relationship (indexical, iconic or 
symbolic), discovery of an an error and ability to re-interpret a sign 
(e.g. I try to justify my interpretation on the basis of iconicity; I may 
also realize that I misinterpreted the gesture – the person observed 
just wanted to get rid of a fly). 
All these three areas require some kind of consciousness16. In the 
sections to follow I analyse two stages of semiotic processing: the initial 
stage involves the perception of a sign as a meaningful entity and the 
metasemiotic processes, i.e. awareness of the semiotic activity of an 
agent.
4.1 EXPERIENCING A SIGN AS A MEANINGFUL ENTITY
We are surrounded by signs. At first blush, the statement seems 
to be false: we are surrounded by objects with certain properties, 
processes or events. If Peirce is right, anything from our environment 
16 As Zlatev noticed, the argument may be related to the one from phenono-
logy (Zlatev 2010): consciousness is needed to have a world (of reference); the 
differentiation between the expression and the referent is based on consciousness, 
as well as the asymmetrical relation between the two.
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may be considered as a sign (once again: a red light at an intersection 
as a sign to stop, someone’s statement: „It’s red”, a person stopping 
before a pedestrian crossing as signs of the same; pain in my stomach 
as a sign of e.g. stomach ulcer; doctor’s words being a sign of the 
same disease, etc.). Everything may be a sign, but, certainly, it is not 
the case that everything i s  a sign. What is important here is the 
subject’s perspective: stomach pain can be taken as a sign (an index) 
of – let us say – an ulcer, but one need not take this viewpoint on the 
pain in question. We, as cognitive agents, have the ability to pick up 
some elements of our environment and treat them as signs (meaning-
inducing entities). In other words, it is a fact about our cognitive 
activity, that we perceive only selected subsets of surrounding objects, 
situations and processes, first as meaningful entities, then as signs17. 
The process is often very fast and does not require much reflection. 
It is often the case that we perceive signs without explicit consideration 
or awareness of them as entities standing for something else. To 
illustrate, a perception of a preceeding car slowing down suddenly 
may evoke a relevant behavior of a person driving behind (applying 
the brakes) or induce some emotions (fear) or beliefs (“Something 
happened”). That is, slowing down may function as a sign of a danger 
or as an unexpected event for another driver. In a similar way, the 
utterance „Stop!” may catch the driver’s attention and cause him or 
her to stop the car or at least make them pay more attention to the 
surroundings. In both cases the reaction is immediate and neither 
reflection nor consideration is involved; if an analysis takes place, it 
follows the initial phase of the perception process. 
I suggest that the initial moment of the semiotic activity of 
a cognitive agent is an experience of meaningfulness, a feeling 
that some perceived entity or event is meaningful. In other words, 
to paraphrase Jackendoff (2007, p. 81), a meaningful entity has 
a distinguished experiential character. Such a feeling may cause an 
immediate decision as to whether the entity mentioned is meaningful 
or not (cf. the discussion of a somatic marker below) and then may 
trigger further analysis of the experienced phenomenon.
17 A clarification is necessary here: experience of a phenomenon as meaningful 
does not make it a sign. It is the initial step in the process of semiosis. In other 
words, it might be necessary for a sign to be experienced as meaningful, but not 
sufficient. 
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4.2 AN EXPERIENTIAL BASIS: QUALIA
The above stipulation about the experience of meaningfulness 
requires special features of our perceptual experience – features 
allowing for distinguishing potentially meaningful entities from 
meaningless ones. “Traditional” approaches to qualia (e.g. Lewis 
1929, Jackson 1982) are not sufficient to explain a special mechanism 
detecting “meaningfulness”. It means that – contrary to some of 
the researchers treating qualia as basic, unanalysable elements of 
our, human conscious experience – one should take a closer look at 
subjective experience and its features. It is possible (and probably 
necessary) to study the structure of qualia. 
Jackendoff (2007, chapter 3) analyses phenomenal experience (in 
reference to perception of natural-language utterances). According to 
his approach, consciousness has at least two dimensions: phenomenal 
content (or in Jackendoffian terms, c o n t e n t  f e a t u r e s  which 
are traditionally discussed in philosophy of mind) and v a l u a t i o n 
f e a t u r e s  (Jackendoff 2007, p. 87). Jackendoff enumerates a number 
of candidate pairs of the latter, e.g.: external (or not), self-initiated (or 
not), familiar (or not), affective (or not) meaningful (or meaningless), 
among others. Two valuations are of particular importance in the 
context of sign perception: the feeling that the perceived object, state 
or situation is meaningful and the feeling of familiarity. The idea of 
the two distinctions is that familiar objects (in particular utterances) 
– in contradistinction to unfamiliar ones – d o  i n d e e d  h a v e 
a  d i f f e r e n t  e x p e r i e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r  (Jackendoff 2007, 
p. 81). Similarly, we experience differently meaningful entities (in 
particular utterances) and meaningless ones. According to Jackendoff, 
if it is true that we experience language in the form of phonological 
images or, in the case of signed languages, in the form of visual or 
proprioceptive experiences (Jackendoff 2007, p. 83), then these 
images (or other experiences) have an additional “felt” character: we 
experience them as meaningful. 
I would like to push the hypothesis one step further: just as in the 
case of language, we tend to experience signs (including non-linguistic 
ones) as meaningful entities as well. Indeed, sometimes one “feels” 
that their experience (of object, sound or reminiscence) is meaningful 
despite one’s inability to grasp the meaning itself. I suppose that such 
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a feeling of meaningfulness is based on one’s past experiences. In such 
cases the feeling of familiarity has some priority: if we are familiar 
with some stimuli (e.g. a special pattern of sounds, typical for a given 
language), my previous experiences (e.g. phonological images) would 
be responsible for the feeling of meaningfulness and later would 
trigger mechanisms of interpretation.
The following two properties of valuation features seem to be 
relevant in the context of semiotic processing. First, these features 
may be subject to error: it may be the case that one has a feeling of 
familiarity when perceiving completely new objects or situations (déjà 
vu); it may also be the case that one has a feeling of meaningfulness 
of an utterance while the utterance is meaningless. Second, valution 
features are, in a sense, independent of perceptual modality. As 
Jackendoff says (2007, p. 88) they c u t  a c r o s s  t h e  „ v e r t i c a l ” 
d o m a i n s  o f  l a n g u a g e ,  v i s i o n  a n d  s o  o n. 
To sum up, when one is experiencing a sign, phenomenal 
consciousness appears to play the first and main role, i.e. we start 
with qualia and their features, and to be precise – with valuation 
features. Such aspects of phenomenal experience bias (or guide) an 
agent’s behavior or direct further cognitive processing, the process 
of interpretation included. The phenomenal valuation (e.g. the 
feeling of being external and meaningful) should form the basis for 
the initial distinction to be drawn between signs and non-signs. The 
above suggestion can be supported by the Damasian idea of a somatic 
marker, elaborated in the next section.
4.3 A HYPOTHETICAL MECHANISM: (SEMIOTIC) MARKERS
Damasio (1994) suggests the existence of a neural mechanism 
known as “somatic marker” which, according to him, provides an 
explanantion for the fast (in fact immediate) decision-making process, 
a mechanism allowing for quick choices between available alternatives. 
The mechanism is based on core consciousness and in particular – on 
emotions. A somatic marker works as an automatic alarm, it warns 
against possible negative consequences of the choice made. The 
warning is based on our previous experiences, encoding associations 
between objects or events and some states of a body. One can think 
also about somatic markers as directing mechanisms where some 
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alternatives are immediately rejected, leaving a much smaller number 
of alternatives to be considered.
According to Damasio, “somatic markers […] assist the deliberation 
by highlighting some options (either dangerous or favorable), and 
eliminating them rapidly from subsequent consideration. You may 
think of it as a system for automated qualification of predictions, which 
acts, whether you want it or not, to evaluate the extremely diverse 
scenarios of the anticipated future before you. Think of it as a biasing 
device” (Damasio 1994, p. 174).
It is worth noting that a somatic marker is a mechanism shaped by 
experience; sometimes it is created during processes of socialization. 
The idea of a somatic marker was a motivation to stipulate an 
analogical mechanism responsible for a detection of (at least some) 
meaningful signals. An initial observation is that human beings, in their 
everyday functioning, decide quite quickly whether certain objects or 
events are meaningful entities. Without a mechanism allowing for 
a quick choice we would be “drowned” in the multiplicity of potential 
signs (not to mention a number of possible interpretations of each of 
them). I am convinced that, in some cases an efficient semiotic activity 
requires some “fast-track” decision mechanism. Such a mechanism, 
called the „semiotic marker” would be enabled by consciousness. 
According to this suggestion it is phenomenal consciousness (and its 
valuation features in particular) that could be responsible for detecting 
meaningful entities in an environment. The above proposition should 
be treated, at least at the moment, as a kind of speculation which 
calls for detailed empirical examination18. To reiterate, this is just an 
initial step in semiotic activity: experience of meaningfulness is not 
a sufficient reason for a sign to be recognized. 
5. USING A SIGN AS A SIGN
Although the role of experience and phenomenal consciousness is 
unquestionable, I am convinced that we cannot explain semiotic activity 
18 The results of the so-called P300 experiment (Chapman, Bragdon 1964) 
may be interesting in this context. The researchers presented subjects two kinds of 
(visual) stimuli: numbers and flashes of light. Chapman and Bragdon concluded 
that ERP responses to visual stimuli differed depending on whether the stimuli 
had meaning or not for subjects.
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of a cognitive agent independently of psychological consciousness 
(awareness). The essence of the claim is particularly clear in the case 
of metasemiosis (and metacognition in general). 
5.1 METACOGNITION AND METASEMIOSIS
Moses and Baird (1999) define metacognition as “any cogni-
tive process that controls or monitors any aspect of cognition”. 
Metaknowledge, in turn, can be defined as “knowledge about knowl-
edge”, which embraces, among other things, beliefs about beliefs (me-
tabeliefs). I treat metasemiosis as a metacognitive process that utilizes 
metaknowledge. Consequently, metasemiosis is understood as a hu-
man capacity to reflect on signs and their usage, to analyse and con-
trol processes of recognition and interpretation of signs, to detect and 
correct errors in semiotic activity, etc. There are at least three reasons 
to discuss metasemiosis in the context of cognitive-semiotic systems. 
First, as Petrilli (2014, p. xviii) points out, “human being is […] an 
animal capable not only of semiosis, but also of semiotics, that is, of 
using signs to reflect on signs”. In other words, a cognitive semiotic 
system is able not only to use signs but also to discuss them: define, 
classify them, reflect on their properties. In general, a semiotic system 
is able to theorize about signs19. 
Second, metasemiotic activity as characterized above is a semiotic 
activity per se. A theory of signs can be analyzed as an example of (meta-)
sign-usage. For instance, a review of this chapter may be analysed as 
the right (or wrong) interpretation of natural language signs. 
The third and main motivation for considering metaknowledge 
in context is the danger of a behavioristic interpretation of semiotic 
activity. According to such an interpretation, a cognitive agent is 
a semiotic system if it reacts in some way to special kinds of stimuli 
(called signs). I wish to claim that mere reaction is not enough as 
the systems displaying such ability are just „as-if ” semiotic systems, 
i.e. systems that behave as if they use signs. The danger of such an 
interpretation emerges from discussions on the possibility of artificial 
semiotic systems: “For a causal system to be a semiotic system, of course, 
it has to be a system for which something can stand for something 
19 It could be a kind of implicit, commonsense (or folk) semiotics.
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(else) in some respect or other, where such a something (sign) can 
affect the (actual or potential) behavior of that system” (Fetzer 1988, 
p. 139)20.
As stated above in line with Peircean approach, a cognitive semiotic 
system must be aware that it uses signs as entities standing for 
something else (in some respect), i.e. the system needs to have some 
metaknowledge embracing the usage of signs as well as be able to 
specify some metaprocesses that control the interpretation and usage 
of signs. The role of such a metalevel is implied in Fetzer’s discussion 
on the possibility of artificial semiotic systems. Fetzer suggests a test 
checking whether a cognitive system is a semiotic system as well. 
The criterion is the capacity to make a mistake. As he indicates, to 
be a real sign-user, a cognitive agent “has to take something to stand 
for s o m e t h i n g  o t h e r  than that for which it stands” (Fetzer 1988, 
p. 141, my emphasis)21. I would modify the statement: the agent has 
to be able to make a mistake and to realize the mistake as well. In 
consequence, a real cognitive and semiotic system should be able to 
realize (among others) that:
– there are possible alternative interpretations of a sign;
– he or she made a mistake in interpreting a sign;
– the sign used is an inappropriate one (taking into account norms of 
a community); 
– a sign is unexpected in particular contexts etc.
5.2 METASEMIOSIS AND AWARENESS
Following Chalmers’ distinction, metasemiotic processes are 
examples of conscious processes in psychological sense. The processes 
seem to be specific in that they require explicit deliberation on semiotic 
acitivties and they distinguish a special class of semiotic systems. As 
mentioned above (section 3.1), of particular interest are: the ability to 
access and report own interpretations of signs; ability to discriminate 
20 As Johan Blomberg noticed (personal communication), some semioticians 
would reject here the applicability of the notion of sign in the context – they would 
treat such behavior-evoking phenomena as mere signals. 
21 Taking something to stand for something other than what it stands for (for 
instance, taking the green light to stand for the obligation to stop at the intersec-
tion) implies – according to Fetzer – the capacity to take something to stand for 
something else (in some respect) in general.
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and categorize kinds of signs, ability to revise interpretations and 
modify behavior, ability to make deliberate choices, plan usage of 
signs, etc. To justify the claim I would like to consider the typical 
mental capacities treated usually as instances of awareness (conscious 
in psychological sense) in connection with metasemiotic activities. One 
is aware when one is able to:
– access own mental states – one is not only stopping at a red light, but 
one knows the reasons for stopping;
– report mental states (the ability assumes introspection and a language 
faculty) – one justifies crossing the junction despite the red light – 
„I noticed the red light, but I am in a hurry so I decided…”;
– discriminate kinds of signs – when one wonders whether a road sign 
„dangerous bend to left” is an icon or a symbol, and why;
– integrate information (and is able to solve inconsistencies) – when 
one sees a red light at an intersection and simultaneously one observes 
a police officer signaling „go”.
All the above examples of metasemiotic activity are clearly 
dependent on psychological consciousness. 
As argued above, Chalmers’ awareness seems to be neurally 
realized in the form of the Damasian extended consciousness. Damasio 
(1999, p. 195) states: “Extended consciousness goes beyond the here 
and now of core consciousness, both backward and forward”. What 
happens when a cognitive-semiotic mind perceives a sign, say, a red 
light? Rather than just access the fact that one experiences redness of 
a red light at a intersection, one can also survey the facts concerning 
the situation: where it is located (in front of you), what caused it (an 
electronic system for managing traffic), when has one experienced 
it before (ten minutes ago), who has also experienced it recently 
(one’s mother), who discussed it (one’s boss), the fact that one should 
perceive a green light soon. As can be seen from these examples, 
the functioning of extended consciousness requires several abilities, 
including the ability to learn and memorize numerous and various 
past experiences, the ability to reactivate those memories in connection 
with „a sense of self knowing”, the ability to direct attention to the 
content of mental states and the ability to predict and plan behaviors. 
Consequently, it seems that, seen from the context of semiotic activity, 
the characteristics of extended consciousness and the description of 
psychological consciousness converge. Both are connected with so-
PIOTR KONDERAK86
called higher-level cognitive processes; both assume a kind of self-
awareness and existence of a self-model. 
Simultaneously the two approaches are formulated at different 
levels22. Psychological consciousness is characterized by a role of 
conscious mental states in the functioning of a cognitive system. To 
explain a cognitive function like the interpretation of an ambiguous 
sign, we need only to specify a mechanism that performs the function 
(Chalmers 2004, p. 620). It seems that extended consciousness is 
perfect for this task.
6. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Cognitive semiotics is by stipulation closely connected with research 
on consciousness and priority is given to first-person methods (Zlatev 
2012). In this paper, I have argued that the first step in the course of 
semiotic activity has such character: it is phenomenal consciousness 
in general and valuation features in particular that allow us to pre-
select meaningful entities. As a result, a cognitive system treats certain 
entities as meaningful without grasping the meanings of such entities. 
The putative mechanism explaining the phenomenon (a semiotic 
marker) is based on past experiences of a system. As a consequence, 
the mechanism works only in reference to a subset of all possible signs. 
The “feeling of meaningfulness” becomes now an impulse to recall 
information e.g. from long-term memory and to further processing. In 
situations involving phenomenal consciousness, subjective experience 
could be (and usually is) followed by psychological consciousness 
(awareness): the feeling that something is meaningful may be followed 
by an analysis of ground of meaningfulness (similarity, convention) 
or attempts to elicite a meaning (cf. also Chalmers 1996, pp. 218–
222). The higher-level metasemiotic processes require, it seems to me, 
psychological consciousness.
To appreciate fully the role of consciousness in cognitive and 
semiotic activities one has to include in the theory one more aspect 
of a sign relation. Consciousness and awareness have their role in 
apprehending the relation between a sign and its object (CP 2.247–
22 In the sense of the Oppenheim-Putnam hierarchy (Oppenheim, Putnam 
1958, p. 9).
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249). I thus stipulate that different kinds of signs (indexes, icons, 
symbols) require different types of consciousness. Icons appear to 
be more closely connected with phenomenal consciousness, whereas 
the use of symbols seems to primarily depend on psychological 
consciousness. This initial suggestion, however, can only be confirmed 
(or not) by further analysis.
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